Unbalanced Random Matching Markets The Start Effect Of Competition

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets The Start Effect Of Competition We study competition in matching markets with random heteroge neous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. first, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes, showing that matching markets are extremely competitive. The balanced market, agents are likely to have stable partners of rank ranging from log nto n=logn, and this di erence in rank can be small or large in terms of utilities. in contrast, in the unbalanced market agents are likely to have a unique stable partner. in matching markets with highly correlated preferences the set of stable matchings is.

Unbalanced Random Matching Markets The Start Effect Of Competition Stability is used often as a criterion in organizing clearinghouses for two sided matching markets, where agents on both sides of the market have preferences over potential matches. we study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences by considering markets with an unequal number of agents on either side. first, we show that even the […]. Abstract. petition in matching markets with random heterogeneous pre. erencesby considering a. unequal number of agents on either side. first, we show that eventh. slightest imba. on of stable. outcomes, showing that matching markets are extremelycompetitive. each. each agent on the long side is either unmatch. Abstract. we study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. first, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an. Published in journal of political economy 1 february 2017. economics. we study competition in matching markets with random heterogeneous preferences and an unequal number of agents on either side. first, we show that even the slightest imbalance yields an essentially unique stable matching. second, we give a tight description of stable outcomes.