Welfare Distribution In Two Sided Random Matching Markets View a pdf of the paper titled welfare distribution in two sided random matching markets, by itai ashlagi and 2 other authors. we study the welfare structure in two sided large random matching markets. in the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her preferences follow a logit model. We study two sided matching markets with randomly generated preferences. next we formalize the model, how preferences are generated and key assumptions. setup. a matching market consists of two sets of agents, referred to as men mand women w. unless speci ed otherwise, we assume that jmj= jwj= n, men are labeled m 1;:::;m n and women are.
Welfare Distribution In Two Sided Random Matching Markets We study the welfare structure in two sided matching markets when agents have latent preferences generated according to observed characteristics. specifically, we are interested in the empirical welfare distribution of agents on each side of the market under stable outcomes as well as the relation between the outcomes of each side of the market. We study the welfare structure in two sided large random matching markets. in the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her preferences follow a logit model based on these scores. under a contiguity condition, we provide a tight description of stable outcomes. Upload an image to customize your repository’s social media preview. images should be at least 640×320px (1280×640px for best display). Abstract. we study the welfare structure in two sided large random matching markets. in the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her.
Comments are closed.